Beyond Protection: The Role of the Home State in Modern Investment Treaties by Gazzini, Tarcisio
Beyond Protection: The Role of the Home
State in Modern Foreign Investment Law
Tarcisio Gazzini
Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2 Role of the Home State Before the Development of Foreign Investment Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3 Role of the Home State in Foreign Investment Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.1 Normative Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2 Adjudication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.3 Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4 Towards a New Role for the Home State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Abstract The chapter examines the evolution of the role of the home state in
foreign investment law. Traditionally, such a role was essentially limited to norm-
setting and protecting nationals and national companies abroad. Protection was
typically offered through diplomatic protection, which was based on the legal fiction
that the state was vindicating its own right. The conclusion of modern investment
treaties, the progressive emancipation of foreign investors and the development of
investor-state arbitration meant a marginalisation of the home state. Some recent
treaties, however, have paved the way for a new role for the home state that goes well
beyond protection of its nationals and national companies. Innovative provisions
have introduced obligations and responsibilities for the home state, especially with
regard to the fight against corruption and the liability of its own investors. It remains
to be seen to which extent these provisions will spread across the international
community of states.
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1 Introduction
The aim of the chapter is to reflect on the role the home state plays in foreign
investment law in the light of some recent developments and in particular some
innovative provisions contained in investment treaties or model treaties. The chapter
is divided in three parts that follow a chronological order: the role traditionally
played by the home state; the role played by the home state in modern foreign
investment law; and the role the home state may play in the future.1
2 Role of the Home State Before the Development
of Foreign Investment Law
Before the full development of international investment law as we know it today, the
role of the home state was essentially limited to protecting its subjects at the
international level. As pointed out by the Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ) in 1924, it was—and still is—“an elementary principle of international law
that a State is entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to
international law committed by another State, from whom they have been unable
to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels”.2
In protecting its subjects, the home state performed three main functions. First, it
contributed to the setting of normative standards for what was essentially the
protection of aliens and their properties abroad. This occurred at the level of
customary international law through legal claims and counterclaims put forward—
and often fiercely resisted—in official documents, such as diplomatic correspon-
dence in the context of international disputes.3
At the same time, states concluded increasingly sophisticated agreements, inter
alia, for the promotion and protection of foreign investment. These agreements took
typically the form of friendship, commerce and navigation (FCN) treaties and similar
instruments. Initially dealing with a rather heterogeneous range of issues, these
treaties progressively focused on economic matters. The most sophisticated of
1Unless otherwise indicated, treaties and investment decisions referred to in this paper are available,
respectively, at https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements, and
https://www.italaw.com.
2Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. UK), 1924 PCIJ (ser. B) No. 3, 30 August 1924,
p. 12. In literature, see in particular Salacuse (2015), esp. Ch. 4; Miles (2013); Polanco (2018). See
also Dumberry (2016), esp. Ch 2.
3For the famous diplomatic correspondence between Mexico and the United States in the 1930s in
relation to the rules governing expropriation in the context of the Mexican economic reforms, see
e.g. the documents reproduced in Hackworth (1942) vol. III, 228. Less known, but equally
interesting is the contemporaneous correspondence between the British and the Mexican govern-
ments, see Correspondence with the Mexican Government regarding the Expropriation of Oil
Properties in Mexico, 8 to 20 May 1938, Cmd. 5758.
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these treaties can be considered as the precursors of modern bilateral investment
treaties (BITs).4
Secondly, the home state played an important role in the adjudication of disputes
concerning alleged violations of the international rules on the treatment of aliens and
their properties. The typical mechanisms were claims commissions, mixed arbitral
tribunals, and occasionally resort to the Permanent Court of Permanent Justice and
later the International Court of Justice (ICJ).5 These disputes were clearly interstate
disputes in which the home state asserted its own rights or, more precisely, “its right
to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law”.6
This is evidenced by the fact that the home state was the claimant,7 and therefore
was in control of the presentation of the claim and the submission of evidence,
although the affected nationals could marginally be involved in the proceedings.
That the claim belonged to the home state was further confirmed by the calculation
of compensation. As pointed out by the PCIJ, “the damage suffered by an individual
is never [. . .] identical in kind with that which will be suffered by a state; it can only
afford a convenient scale for the calculation of the reparation due to the State”.8
Thirdly, with regard to the enforcement of the rules on the protection of nationals
and their properties, the home state characteristically acted in diplomatic protection,
which was based on the legal fiction that “an injury to the national was an injury to
the State”.9 The home state did not hesitate to intervene militarily in a period in
which, “from the nature of things and the absence of any common superior tribunal,
nations [were] compelled to have recourse [to go to war], in order to assert and
vindicate their rights”.10 The action of the home state typically took the form of what
was elegantly—but by no means less brutally—called gunboat diplomacy.11 Signif-
icantly, the first treaty limitation on the use of military force related precisely to the
4For two interesting examples, compare the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce, and Naviga-
tion between the United States and Bolivia (1858) at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/
bolivia01.asp, and the much more sophisticated Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations between
the United States and Ethiopia (1951), 206UNTS 41. In the second agreement the parties committed
themselves to accord “at all times fair and equitable treatment” to the respective nationals and
companies, and to expropriate their properties only for public purposes and against “prompt
payment of just and effective compensation” (Article VIII).
5See Parlett (2011), esp. Ch. 2.
6Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. UK), 1924
PCIJ (ser. B) No. 3, 30 August 1924, p. 12.
7As expressly held by the Germany-United States Mixed Claims Commission in Administrative
Decision II, 1 November 1923, VII UNRIIA 23, p. 26.
8Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów, PCIJ, Series A, No. 17 (1928), p. 28.
9International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection (2006), Commentary to
Article 1, para 4.
10Phillimore (1885), vol. III, p. 77.
11Borchard (1929), p. 121; Tomz (2007).
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recovery of contract debt claims claimed by one government from another govern-
ment as due to the former’s nationals.12
The exercise of diplomatic protection was opposed by several Latin American
states, which developed the so-called Calvo doctrine.13 According to the doctrine,
foreigners were entitled to the same protection as nationals and could not lay claim to
more extensive protection.14 An important corollary of the doctrine was that states
could not intervene in diplomatic protection. Latin American states sought to
exclude diplomatic protection through the inclusion in contracts with foreigners of
the so-called Calvo clause.15
3 Role of the Home State in Foreign Investment Law
3.1 Normative Function
The first function sketched in the previous section, namely norm-setting, is still
firmly in the hands of states. The legal protection of foreign investment has changed
radically with the conclusion since 1959 of more than 3000 bilateral investment
agreements or economic integration agreements containing provisions on invest-
ment.16 The conclusion of these agreements recorded a spectacular increase in the
1990s and 2000s.
States remain the masters of these agreements. They negotiate, amend, interpret
and terminate them (unilaterally or by mutual consent) in accordance with the terms
of the agreements themselves and the law of treaties. Contrary to FCN treaties,
modern BITs focus exclusively on the promotion and protection of foreign invest-
ment. They contain increasingly sophisticated definitions and substantive and pro-
cedural rules.17
12Convention Respecting the Limitation of Employment of Force for Recovery of Contract Debts
(The Hague Convention II), concluded on 18 October 1907, at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_
century/hague072.asp.
13The doctrine was originally elaborated by Andrés Bello, see Montt (2009), pp. 41–44. It was
proclaimed in Article 9 of the 1933 Convention on the Duties and Rights of States, 26 December
1933, 165 LNTS 19.
14Calvo (1896), p. 231. See also Hershey (1907), p. 1; Shea (1955); Orrego Vicuña (2003), p. 19;
Schreuer (2005).
15See Summers (1933), p. 459; Lipstein (1945), p. 130.
16According to UNCTAD’s website, 3291 investment agreements have been concluded and 2649
of them have entered into force, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-
agreements.
17To appreciate the evolution of BITs, it is sufficient to compare a BIT concluded by the United
States in the 1990s with the BIT concluded with Uruguay on 4 November 2004. In literature, see in
particular Dolzer and Stevens (1995); Sacerdoti (1997), p. 251; Vandevelde (2010); Van Harten
(2010); Salacuse (2015); Brown (2013).
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3.2 Adjudication
The real breakthrough, however, has occurred with regard to the second function,
namely adjudication of disputes. Modern investment agreements systematically
provide for two categories of disputes: interstate disputes and disputes between
investors and the host state. While interstate disputes remain rather exceptional,
according to UNCTAD, the number of known investor-state disputes is approaching
1000.18 Virtually all investment treaties19 give the concerned foreign investors
access to international arbitration tribunals, normally without any obligation to
exhaust domestic remedies beforehand.20 The rationale behind these provisions is
precisely to remove the dispute from the domestic arena and insulate it from any kind
of pressure, including political pressure.21
These provisions propel foreign investors into the realm of international dispute
settlement, a development that can be explained in two ways.22 According to the first
explanation, the agreement creates a legal relationship between the host state and the
investor, the latter being the holder of substantive rights. Violations of these rights can
be vindicated directly by the investor. As held by a tribunal, investment arbitration is
“a remedy exercisable by an investor by itself and in its own right against the host
state”.23 It is worth noting that some investment treaties, such as the BIT between
Peru and the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU), expressly recognise
“that investors of one of the Contracting Parties are entitled to prevail directly their
rights against the other Contracting Party through the arbitration.”24
18At https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement. On the current discussion
on the reform of investment arbitration within UNCITRAL, see https://uncitral.un.org/en/working_
groups/3/investor-state. On asymmetries of investment arbitration, see in particular Toral and
Schultz (2010). See also Laborde (2010) and Van Harten (2012).
19For two exeptions, see the BIT between Bulgaria and Cyprus, concluded on 17 November 1987
and entered into force on 18 May 1988, and the free trade agreement (FTA) between the United
States and Australia, concluded on 18 May 2004 and entered into force on 1 January 2005.
20See Paulsson (1995), Sornarajah (2000), McLachlan et al. (2007) and De Brabandere (2015).
21See, for instance, Gas Natural SDG v Argentina, ICSID ARB/03/10, Decision on Jurisdiction,
17 June 2005, paras 29 ff.
22Douglas (2003), especially pp. 181–184; De Brabandere (2015), Ch. 2.
23Plama v. Bulgaria, ICSID ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005, para. 150. In
Gas Natural SDG v Argentina, ICSID ARB/03/10, Decision on Jurisdiction, 17 June 2005, para.
34, the tribunal held that “the foreign investor acquires rights” under the treaty. In Corn Products
International, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID ARB (AF)/04/1, Decision on Responsibility, 15 January 2008,
para. 168, the tribunal held that NAFTA contracting parties intended “to confer substantive rights
directly upon investors”. In Case No. A/18, 5 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. (1984-I) 251, p. 261, the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal emphasised that “it is the rights of the claimant, not of his nation, that are to
be determined by the Tribunal”. See also, UK Court of Appeal (Civil Division), Occidental
Exploration & Production Company and Ecuador, 9 September 2005, [2005] EWCA Civ 1116,
para. 18.
24Article 11.2, second sentence, of the BLEU-Peru BIT, concluded on 12 October 2005 and entered
into force on 12 September 2008.
Beyond Protection: The Role of the Home State in Modern Foreign Investment Law 23
Alternatively, a second and more conservative explanation splits substantive and
procedural provisions. From this perspective, substantive rules continue to be
binding exclusively upon states, while investors are permitted to file requests for
arbitration in case of violation.25 From this perspective, the right of investors is
derivative as states have transferred the right to seek the enforcement of the obliga-
tions contained in the treaty to their respective foreign investors. According to a
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) tribunal, foreign investors “are
permitted for convenience to enforce what are in origin the rights of Party states”.26
In spite of the different theoretical foundations, however, the ultimate result is in
good substance the same. In sharp contrast with disputes described in the previous
section, in investment arbitration the claim is put forward and managed by the
investor itself. The investor first attempts to reach a friendly settlement, makes a
selection between the possible fora (if more than one are available), is involved in the
appointment of the members of the tribunal, is in charge of all litigation strategies,
submits all written documents, participates in the hearings, and ultimately is the
recipient of compensation, if any is due.27 As pointed out by a tribunal, “[t]he State
of nationality of the Claimant does not control the conduct of the case. No compen-
sation which is recovered will be paid to the State”.28 Quite the contrary, the idea of
investment arbitration is precisely to keep the state as much as possible away from
the proceedings.
The emancipation of investors as fully independent actors allowing them to bring
and manage their own claims before arbitral tribunals means that claims brought
against the host state by a foreign investor and by the home state are independent,
even if they refer to the same measures or conduct. In Plama v. Bulgaria, the tribunal
convincingly held that even if the investor cannot invoke the relevant provision on
the settlement of investor-state disputes (Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty
(ECT)),29 the right of the home state to invoke the state-state dispute settlement
provision (Article 27 of the ECT) remains intact.30
25This seems to be the preferred position of Canada,Methanex v.United States, Second Submission
of Canada Pursuant to NAFTA Article 1128, 30 April 2001, para. 9, at https://www.
investorstatelawguide.com/documents/documents/UN-0015-29%20-%20Methanex%20v.%20US
%20-%20Canada%201128%20Subm%202.pdf.
26Loewen Group, Inc v. United States, ICSID ARB (AF)/98/3 (NAFTA), Award, 26 June 2003,
para. 233. NAFTA was concluded on 17 December 1992 and entered into force on 1 January 1994.
27This is without prejudice to the possibility of negotiations between the host and the home state, or
the institution of proceedings by the latter against the former.
28As pointed out in Corn Products International, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID ARB (AF)/04/1, Decision
on Responsibility, 15 January 2008, para. 173 and footnote 70, only exceptionally is the investor
not fully in control of the claim. This is the case of Article 2103(6) of NAFTA, according to which
the home state and the host state can effectively preclude a putative claim of expropriation based
upon a taxation measure by determining that the measure in question was not an expropriation.
29Concluded on 17 December 1994 and entered into force on 16 April 1998.
30Plama v. Bulgaria, ICSID ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005, para. 150.
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Furthermore, the home state cannot prevent its own investors from filing a request
for arbitration, not even if it has started state-state proceedings. In Empresas
Lucchetti v. Peru, the host state asked for the suspension of the investor-state
proceedings since the claimant’s allegations at the heart of the dispute were the
object of a concurrent state-state arbitration. The tribunal held that the conditions for
a suspension of the proceedings were not met and rejected the request without further
discussion.31
The independence of each claim is further demonstrated by the fact that some
treaties expressly preclude the possibility of international claims brought by the
home state if the investor has started arbitration proceedings, unless the host state has
failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in the dispute. Article 27(1) of
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) offers an excellent example. It pro-
vides that “[n]o Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an
international claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another
Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitra-
tion under this Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have failed to
abide by and comply with the award rendered in such dispute”.32 Finally, in
investor-state disputes, the home state can make—and has indeed made—non-
disputing party submissions expressing disagreement with the position of its own
investors, an issue that will be discussed below.33
Yet, in spite of the developments concerning the settlement of disputes through
arbitration, diplomatic protection retains its importance, especially before resort to
arbitration. Diplomatic action continues to be used for the purpose of facilitating the
settlement of the dispute,34 and even of pushing the host state to consent to
arbitration.35 From this perspective, diplomatic protection has not been disposed
of by arbitration, but rather plays a complementary role.36
Furthermore, it is worth noting that diplomatic protection has undergone a
profound evolution. The International Law Commission has considered the legal
31Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Peru, S.A. v. Peru, ICSID ARB/03/4, Award, 7 February
2005, paras 7 and 9.
32For other examples, Article 34.3 of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Comprehensive Investment Agreement; Article 14.13(i) of the Indian Model BIT; Article 30.1 of
the Belarus-India BIT, signed on 24 September 2018 (not in force yet). See also Appendix III,
Article 4 of the Arbitration Rules of the Stockholm Chamber Commerce.




34This is fully consistent with Article 27 of the ICSID Convention. See the action of the German
Government in relation to the claim brought by Fraport against the Philippines in Polanco
(2018), p. 226.
35See Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Costa Rica, ICSID ARB/96/1, Final Award,
17 February 2000, paras 24–26.
36See Polanco (2018), p. 230.
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fiction behind the traditional exercise of diplomatic protection as unnecessary in
contemporary international law and recognised that states may exercise it in their
own right, that of their nationals, or both.37 From this perspective, in CSM v.
Argentina, the tribunal did not hesitate to hold that “the State of nationality is no
longer considered to be protecting its own interest in the claim but that of the
individual affected”.38
3.3 Enforcement
With regard to the third function, namely enforcement, the introduction of invest-
ment arbitration has also meant a significant retreat of the home state once the
investor has instituted arbitral proceedings and possibly the relegation of diplomatic
protection to the hypothesis of failure by the host state to comply with the award
rendered by the arbitral tribunal. A minority of investment treaties (around 12%)
expressly preclude resort to diplomatic protection during arbitral proceedings, apart
from informal diplomatic exchanges genuinely meant to facilitate the settlement of
the dispute.39
It remains to be seen whether diplomatic protection is still available during
arbitral proceedings when the relevant treaties are silent on the issue. In Italy
v. Cuba, the ad hoc arbitral tribunal held by majority that “tant que l’investisseur
ne s’est pas soumis à l’arbitrage international contre l’Etat d’accueil, son droit à la
protection diplomatique subsiste”.40 The statement hints a contrario to the fact that
diplomatic protection is not available once arbitral proceedings have been instituted.
This position seems to be shared by some scholars. According to one view, invest-
ment arbitration is based on a trade-off since “the potential respondent State accepts
to arbitrate with a private entity and [. . .] is relieved from the risk of being exposed to
diplomatic protection by the investor’s Home State”.41
Yet, other authors are sceptical about the exclusion of diplomatic protection
during arbitration proceedings in the absence of a specific treaty provision in this
37Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries (2006), Article 1, Commentary, para.
5, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (2006) Vol. II, Part II, 27.
38CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, ICSID ARB/01/8, Decision on Jurisdiction,
17 July 2003, para. 45 (relying on Bederman (2002), pp. 253–256). Quoted with approval in
Italy v. Cuba, Interim Award, 15 March 2005, para. 65. In the Final Award, 1 January 2008, para.
141, the Tribunal seems more hesitant when holding that the home state acting in diplomatic
protection still makes the claims its own (“s’approprie”).
39Paparinskis (2008), pp. 281–297.
40Italy v. Cuba, Interim Award, 15 March 2005,para 65; Final Award, 1 January 2008, para. 141.
41Kaufmann-Kohler (2013), pp. 324–325. See also Kokott (2002), esp. p. 31; Juratowitch (2008),
pp. 21–22.
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sense.42 They have insisted on the absence of sufficient evidence on the emergence
of customary rules preventing states from exercising diplomatic protection once
arbitral proceedings have been instituted. According to this view, the very fact that
some treaty provisions—such as Article 27 of the ICSID Convention—preclude
diplomatic protection during arbitral proceeding proves that the two remedies are
autonomous and may well coexist as long as the concerned states have not agreed
otherwise.
The delicate relationship between diplomatic protection and investment arbitra-
tion has resurfaced in the context of the 2014 Rules on Transparency of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), whose Article 5
(2) in fine directs the tribunal to take into account, when allowing non-disputing
party submissions, “the need to avoid submissions which would support the claim of
the investor in a manner tantamount to diplomatic protection”.43
It is well known that several investment treaties, such as NAFTA,44 the Compre-
hensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the European Union and
Canada,45 or the BIT between Peru and Japan,46 offer the non-disputing state parties
the possibility of presenting formal written submissions on the interpretation of the
relevant treaty provisions with a view to assisting the tribunal in its search of the
common intention of the parties as recorded in the treaty.47 Obviously, the interpre-
tation put forward in the non-disputing party submission may influence the decision
of the tribunal since interpretation “[i]nvolves understanding the intention” of the
parties to the treaty.48 Indeed, this is precisely the purpose of the submissions,
namely to safeguard the “legitimate”49 or “systemic”50 interest of the treaty parties
to the treaty in the correct interpretation of the treaty.
Non-disputing party submissions relate to the interpretation of certain treaty
provisions and as such must be abstract and detached from the merits of the dispute.
42Polanco (2018), p. 222, notes that “in the absence of a specific provision in an investment treaty or
the applicable arbitral rules, there should be no limitation on having both [Investor-State Arbitra-
tion] and diplomatic protection claims in parallel”. See also Paparinskis (2008), pp. 281–300.
43See https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Trans
parency-E.pdf.
44Article 1128 of NAFTA.
45Article 8.38(2) of CETA, concluded on 30 October 2016 and entered into provisional application
on 21 September 2017, with the exclusion of the chapter on investment.
46Article 18(17) of the Japan-Peru BIT, concluded on 21 November 2008 and entered into force on
10 December 2009.
47In 2015, the estimation was that well under 1% of investment treaties provide explicitly for
submissions by non-disputing parties, see Gordon and Pohl (2015), p. 26.
48Mobil Investments Inc. & Murphy Oil Corporation v. Canada, ICSID ARB(AF)/07/4, Decision
on Liability and on Principles of Quantum, 22 May 2012, para. 254, quoted with approval in Mesa
Power Group LLC v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2012-17 (NAFTA and UNCITRAL), Award,
24 March 2016, para. 405.
49Kinnear (2006).
50Paparinskis and Howley (2015), p. 196.
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If they are not, the tribunal should simply discard them. Whether a submission is in
favour of the investor should be incidental. The reference to “tantamount to diplo-
matic protection” in Article 5(2) of the 2014 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency51
can indeed be read as excluding submissions intended to advance the cause of the
investor by taking position on the specific circumstances of the pending dispute
instead of clarifying the non-disputing party’s position on certain points of treaty
interpretation. Otherwise the state would unduly interfere with the proceedings and
affect their independence and fairness.
The risk is however more apparent than real. According to an arbitrator, the
respondent state and the non-disputing state(s) inevitably “club together” to share the
same interpretation at the expense of the investor.52 Whatever the merits of this view
and the negative connotation attached to it, the statement demonstrates that the home
state does not necessarily share the position of its own nationals and has moved away
from its role as protector. Indeed, the attitude of the home state must be seen through
the lens of mutual interest and reciprocity, the engines of the development of
international law. From this perspective, the home state is more interested in the
proper interpretation of the treaty rather than in the outcome of the specific dispute
before the tribunal. In other words, what really matters to the home state is ensuring
that all investors falling within the scope of the treaty enjoy exactly the protection the
contracting parties had agreed to grant them, nothing less and nothing more.
Ultimately, in addition to diplomatic protection, the home state may adopt the
measures permitted under general international law to induce compliance by the host
state with its investment obligations or final and binding investment awards.53 Such
measures may typically take the form of acts of retorsion, which consist in unfriendly
measures always available to states—since they are not inconsistent with any
relevant international obligations—possibly including withdrawal from the World
Trade Organization’s (WTO) Generalized Systems of Preferences.54 Alternatively,
the home state may resort to countermeasures. This presupposes a prior breach of
international law—in this case non-compliance with investment obligations or
investment awards—, it implies a conduct otherwise contrary to international law
and must respect all conditions required under the rules on state responsibility.55
It remains however doubtful whether, in the case of a plurilateral investment
treaty, the right to adopt countermeasures may be extended also to what the
International Law Commission has qualified under Article 54 of the Articles on
51See https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Trans
parency-E.pdf.
52C. N. Brower, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Mesa Power Group LLC v. Canada, PCA
Case No. 2012-17 (NAFTA and UNCITRAL), Award, 24 March 2016, para. 30.
53See Schreuer et al. (2009), p. 1109; Echandi (2012).
54See Alford (2014); Titi (2014); Polanco (2018), pp. 205–209.
55See International Law Commission, Articles on State Responsibility (2001), especially Articles
49 to 53, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (2001) Vol. II, Part II, 20. Countermea-
sures have normally been discussed as circumstances precluding wrongfulness see, in particular,
Paparinskis (2008).
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the Responsibility of States as “States other than the injured State”—or, for the
purpose of this chapter “states other than the home state”. Since the obligations
imposed by the treaty are clearly based on reciprocity and not “established for the
protection of a collective interest of the group”,56 the right to adopt countermeasures
clearly only concerns the home state. Indeed, these obligations are divisible, in the
sense that a state may breach them with regard to one but not necessarily all other
states parties to the treaty.57
4 Towards a New Role for the Home State
The role the home state is going to play in the future, and indeed the role it has
already started to play, must be appreciated in the context of the reform that the entire
investment treaty regime is currently undergoing.58 After the golden period between
1990 and the 2000s, the popularity of investment treaties has significantly dropped.
States are now rather reluctant to conclude investment agreements, although region-
alism is still on the rise.59 A significant number of BITs have been terminated and
their global number has started to decline. States have responded differently to the
three main concerns raised with regard to investment treaties: their manifestly
unbalanced content;60 the safeguard of regulatory powers, which many states per-
ceive as inadequate;61 and the lack of legitimacy and other shortcomings of invest-
ment arbitration.62
56Article 48(1)(a) of the Articles on State Responsibility, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission (2001) Vol. II, Part II, p. 20.
57Contra Echandi (2012), p. 122.
58See UNCTAD, Reforming Investment Dispute Settlement: A Stocktaking, IIA Issues Note No
3 (May 2019) https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/news/hub/1608/20190329-reforming-invest
ment-dispute-settlement-a-stocktaking. See also UNCTAD, Reform Package for the International
Investment Regime (2018 edition) https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/uploaded-files/document/
UNCTAD_Reform_Package_2018.pdf.
59See UNCTAD, The Rise of Regionalism in International Investment Policymaking: Consolida-
tion or Complexity?, IIA Issues Note No 3 (June 2013) http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.
aspx?OriginalVersionID¼532. On investment agreements concluded by the European Union or
under negotiation, see the Commission’s website https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-
markets/investment/index_en.htm. On African regional agreements, see Special Issue, 18 Journal
of World Investment & Trade (2017).
60In Spyridon v. Romania, ICSID ARB/06/1, Award, 7 December 2011, para. 871, the tribunal
conceded that the relevant BIT “imposes no obligation on investors, only on contracting States”.
61As pointed out by the Commonwealth Investment Experts Group Meeting for the African Region,
“[o]ne common issue is the need to clarify the interaction between international investment
instruments and domestic investment policy as well as policy in other areas – for e.g., sustainable
development and environmental regulation. Governments must always be concerned about ensur-
ing that there is sufficient policy space for them to engage in reconciling competing interests”,
Kampala, Uganda, 20-21 October 2011, on file with author.
62See, in particular, Waibel et al. (2010); Kalicki and Joubin-Bret (2015).
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Some states have modernized their BITs with a view to bringing them in line with
the development of international law, rebalancing and better defining their substan-
tive provisions, and recalibrating the host state’s exposure to arbitration.63 States
have also adopted new and more sophisticated model BITs, as the Model Text for the
Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty adopted in 2015 (hereinafter Indian Model BIT),
which will be used in the negotiations of BITs between India and other states and can
also be expected to inspire other governments.64 Other states have reconsidered their
investment treaty policy and eventually decided to switch to domestic legislation.
The adoption of the South African Protection of Investment Act (2015), which is
largely pegged to the South African Constitution, is a good example.65
The concerns under discussion are real and have been addressed primarily by
striking a better balance between, on the one hand, the rights and obligations of the
host state and, on the other hand, those of investors. Moreover, a few legal instru-
ments have introduced provisions imposing obligations upon the home state and
enhancing the collaboration between the host and home states, most prominently in
the promotion of sustainable development, the fight against corruption and the
liability of foreign investors.
From this perspective, the Economic Community of West African States’
(ECOWAS) Supplementary Act of 2008 can be considered as having pioneered a
new approach.66 Several of its innovative provisions have subsequently made their
way into other African treaties as well as treaties outside that continent. The
ECOWAS Supplementary Act includes an entire section on the rights and obliga-
tions of the home state, dealing with four issues, namely facilitation of foreign
investment, disclosure of information, liability of investors, and the fight against
corruption.67
In accordance with the ECOWAS Supplementary Act, first, the home state may
facilitate cross border investment and is obliged to inform the host state of the
measures adopted in this regard.68 Second, and more incisively, the home states
shall, on request and subject to a confidentiality caveat, promptly provide a potential
host state with the information expected to enable the latter to comply with its
63See, for instance, the Morocco-Nigeria BIT, concluded on 3 December 2016 (not entered into
force yet).
64See https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%20
Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf. For the agreements concluded since the adop-
tion of the Model BIT or under negotiation see https://www.dea.gov.in/bipa?page¼10.
65See https://www.thedti.gov.za/gazzettes/39514.pdf. For a much more pro-investor piece of leg-
islation, see the Law Relating to Investment Promotion and Facilitation adopted by Rwanda in 2015
(N 06/2015) https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-laws/laws/82/rwanda-investment-
law.
66Supplementary Act A/SA.3/12/08 Adopting Community Rules on Investment and the Modalities
for their Implementation with ECOWAS (hereinafter ECOWAS Supplementary Act), concluded on
28 December 2008 and entered into force on 19 January 2009.
67Section VI of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act.
68Article 27 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act.
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obligations under the treaty and domestic legislation. The home states shall also, on
request, promptly provide information on standards that may apply to investors, and
most prominently, those related to social and environmental impact assessments.69
On the latter point, it is worth stressing that the home state may contribute to
standard-setting and to the review of standards applicable to the authorisation and
management of investments made by its own investors in the host state. The main
aim of these provisions is to optimise the impact of investment projects as well as to
enhance compliance by the host state with its international commitments.
With regard to the liability of its own investors, the ECOWAS Supplementary
Act imposes upon the home state the obligation to ensure that its legal system allows
for, or does not prevent or unduly restrict, civil action before its courts in relation to
liability for damages resulting from alleged acts or decisions made by investors in
the territory of the host state. The host state laws on liability shall apply to such civil
proceedings.70
The above provision on liability has been reproduced in the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) Model BIT Template (2012),71 in the BIT
between Morocco and Nigeria,72 and more importantly the 2015 Indian Model
BIT.73 However, and quite significantly, the provision has not been included neither
in the BIT concluded between India and Belarus on 24 September 2018,74 nor in the
Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Treaty concluded between India and Brazil
on 25 January 2020.75 This is a clear reminder that states may be reluctant to accept
international obligations in this respect.
As pointed out by the Indian Law Commission in its analysis of the 2015 Indian
Model BIT, the provision aims at removing or minimising jurisdictional constraints
that could prevent civil action before the tribunals of the home state, most promi-
nently under the forum non conveniens doctrine on grounds that there is a more
appropriate forum to hear the case.76 This would be typically the case of a dispute
69Article 28 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act. Article 5 of the Morocco-Nigeria BIT provides
that “[t]he Parties shall exchange information concerning investment, particularly through the Joint
Committee. Whenever possible, the information shall, reveal, in advance, useful data on procedures
and special requirements for investment, business opportunities and expectations for major parties
projects”.
70Article 29 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act.
71See https://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-template-final.pdf,
Article 17.
72Article 20 reads: “Investors shall be subject to civil actions for liability in the judicial process of
their home state for the acts or decisions made in relation to the investment where such acts or
decisions lead to significant damage, personal injuries or loss of life in the host state”.
73Article 13, entitled Home State Obligations.
74Not entered into force yet.
75Not entered into force yet.
76Law Commission of India, Report 260 http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/Report260.
pdf, p. 37. On the doctrine, see amongst many, Brand and Jablonski (2007) and Gardner (2017). On
the resilience of the doctrine, see Holly (2019).
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such as the one related to the infamous Bophal incident,77 which was expressly
mentioned by the Indian Law Commission.78
Enhancing the liability of the home state has found the support of Nobel Prize
economist Joseph Stiglitz, who emphasised, with regard to the liability of multina-
tional companies under the United States Alien Tort Act,79 that civil claims “will not
harm economic development of least developed countries, United States businesses
operating abroad, or investment in the United States”.80
Coming back to the ECOWAS Supplementary Investment Act, investors must
refrain from engaging in practices of corruption.81 Connivance in corruption certi-
fied by a court of the host state would deprive the investor of the right under the
treaty to bring a claim against the host state.82 Interestingly, not only the host but also
the home state may object, on grounds of violations of the above provision, to the
jurisdiction of any tribunal before which the investor has brought a case under the
treaty.83
Moreover, the host state must make corrupt practices criminal offences and
investigate, prosecute and punish them with appropriate sanctions.84 The home
state, in turn, must ensure that any money or other benefits obtained through these
practices is not recoverable or deductible through any fiscal or tax policies. The
home state must also provide all available information that might assist a tribunal
dealing with a claim brought under the treaty in determining whether there has been
a breach of an anti-corruption obligation.85
Furthermore, both the host and the home state may initiate proceedings against
the investor in case of breaches of the prohibition to become involved in corruption,
or in case of persistent failure to comply with domestic obligations related to
hygiene, security, health and social welfare, human rights and fundamental labour
standards, as well as corporate governance and practices.86 The dispute will fall
within the jurisdiction of a tribunal established in accordance with the
77For a recent discussion of the complex litigation in the United States that followed the Bophal
incident, see Krishna (2020). See also, Muchlinski (1987), p. 545; Baxi (1986).
78Law Commission of India, Report 260 http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/Report260.
pdf, pp. 36–37.
7928 USC § 1350. See in particular Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 US 10, 17 April
2013. In Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018), 24 April 2018, the United States
Supreme Court held by a five-four Justice majority that foreign corporations cannot be sued under
the Act https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-499_1a7d.pdf.
80Brief of Joseph E. Stiglitz as amicus curiae, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum CO et al,
11 December 2011 https://harvardhumanrights.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/brief-of-joseph-e-
stiglitz.pdf.
81Article 13 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act. See also Article 17 of the Morocco-Nigeria BIT.
82Article 18.1 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act.
83Article 18.1 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act.
84Article 30.1 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act.
85Article 30.3 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act.
86Article 18. 3 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act.
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Supplementary Act. This part of the provision remains obscure as the Supplementary
Act expressly provides only for the judicial settlement of a dispute between the host
state and investors.87 This serious shortcoming notwithstanding, the provision shows
that states can go as far as envisaging a role for the home state in the judicial
enforcement of the obligations of its own nationals under the treaty.
The above provisions design a role for the home state that is much more complex
than the traditional norm-setting and protection of national investors and invest-
ments. They have introduced new responsibilities for the home state that, at least
potentially, enhance the collaboration with the host state, increase the standard of
liability for foreign investors, and ultimately may improve the legitimacy of foreign
investment law.
5 Conclusions
Traditionally, the home state acted as the protector of national investors and could
make investors’ claims its own for the purpose of diplomatic protection. The
establishment and development of increasingly sophisticated and efficient interna-
tional mechanisms for the settlement of disputes between investors and the host state
have profoundly modified the situation. On the one hand, foreign investors have
been fully emancipated and can normally bring their own claims before international
arbitral tribunals. They are in control of the entire process of adjudication, although
they may need the support of their own state in case of non-compliance with the
arbitral award. On the other hand, the home state has been relegated to a rather
marginal role as demonstrated, inter alia, by the scarcity of state-state investment
disputes. During the proceedings, the presence of the home state has become much
more discrete and it is not necessarily supportive of the national investors’ claims, as
in the case of non-disputing party submissions.
Recently, however, a few investment treaties provide for a more active role of the
home state. Although such treaties still remain rather isolated, it is possible to detect
a relatively clear trend. Home states are progressively called to play a role that goes
well beyond the traditional protection and may contribute to the reform of the
investment treaty regime. Such a role is emerging in areas where the public interest
is of paramount importance, such as the protection of the environment, the fight
against corruption, and the liability of multinational companies. Yet, borrowing from
the nomenclature of Hollywood’s Oscar awards, the home state will probably never
be nominated for a leading role. This will remain the domain of the host state and
foreign investors. But in due time the home state may receive a nomination for a
supporting role.
87Article 33.6 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act.
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